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SUPREME DISGORGEMENT 
Caprice L. Roberts* 
Abstract 
Disgorgement of a defendant’s wrongful gains is an ancient remedy. 
It applies across a spectrum of contexts—from trademark infringement to 
fiduciary duties, from common law to statutes, from public to private law. 
This remedy is not regarded as quintessential in American contract law, 
but that is changing. My earlier work, as cited by the Supreme Court, 
predicted this shift based upon a new rule in the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment. The rule operationalizes 
disgorgement of profits for opportunistic breaches of contract. This new 
conceptualization of precedent authorizes a gain-based remedy that 
exceeds the compensation goals of contract law’s preferred, default 
remedy of expectancy damages.  
This remedy is bold and will affect the law of contracts, remedies, and 
restitution. I show, in a companion article, how state and federal courts 
resolve novel disgorgement requests for breach of contract claims. This 
Essay examines an unusual endorsement of disgorgement by the Supreme 
Court, sitting in original jurisdiction over the breach of a water-rights 
compact between states. Harnessing broad powers of equity jurisdiction, 
the Court adopts a $1.8 million disgorgement award exceeding 
compensation. It strips part of a defendant’s profits and stacks on a 
compensatory award for losses sustained. Relying on the Restatement 
(much to Justice Scalia’s chagrin), the Court permits disgorgement to 
deter a defendant from knowingly exposing a plaintiff to a substantial risk 
of breach. The Court’s provocative application offers a lens through 
which to explore broader questions: whether, when, and how the 
disgorgement remedy should apply to breach of contracts, whether public 
or private. This Essay concludes that disgorgement is a valuable remedy 
for breach of contract but that judges must exercise reasoned discretion, 
by applying disgorgement to proper facts and by using restraint in tying 
the measurement to causation. The inclusion of disgorgement in the 
stable of remedies broadens the scope of contract law to include inquiries 
and features typically associated with tort law. As in all of my remedies 
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work, this Essay argues that remedies shape rights—here, granting the 
remedy of disgorgement expands the shape of the underlying contract 
right in both public and private law. 
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“‘[I]t is important that water flows down the river, not just money.’ 
Accordingly, this Court may order disgorgement of gains, if needed to 
stabilize a compact and deter future breaches, when a State has 
demonstrated reckless disregard of another, more vulnerable State’s 
rights under that instrument.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a sleeper 
case, Kansas v. Nebraska,2 over shared water resources allocated per state 
agreement.3 In a split opinion,4 the Court resolved the controversy in 
favor of Kansas, ordering Nebraska to pay a $1.8 million disgorgement 
award in addition to compensatory relief.5 This case has meaningful 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 (2015) (citation omitted) (quoting Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 24, Kansas, 135 S. Ct. 1042 (No. 126), 2014 WL 5398224). 
 2. 135 S. Ct. 1042 (2015). 
 3. Id. at 1048–49.  
 4. Id. at 1048 (ruling 6–3 on two issues—the grant of partial disgorgement and the denial 
of injunctive relief, and ruling 5–4 on reformation of accounting procedures). 
 5. Id. at 1051–52. State agreements over water rights require federal congressional 
approval, which converts the agreement into a compact, here the Republican River Basin Compact 
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implications for the law of contracts, remedies, and restitution. The Court 
authorizes a partial disgorgement for knowing breach of the relevant 
quasi-public agreements, denies injunctive relief, and modifies the water-
allocation accounting procedures.6 Two vigorous dissenting opinions cite 
to one of my restitution articles for the prediction that the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment’s section on disgorgement 
for opportunistic breaches of contract would extend traditional contract 
doctrine.7 Though I stand by my prediction, I reject the notion that the 
extension of conventional contract doctrine is unwarranted, especially 
under the proper circumstances. The Supreme Court’s treatment provides 
a ripe opportunity for reexamination of when disgorgement should lie for 
breaches of promises. 
This Essay offers four takeaways from the Supreme Court’s ruling: 
(1) in the law-equity determination, equity is presumed; (2) disgorgement 
beyond compensation is warranted to deter and to afford more complete 
relief; (3) knowing satisfies the requisite intent for disgorgement; and 
(4) the insufficiency of other remedies justifies the reach to 
disgorgement. The Court emphasizes the public nature of the case, thus 
preserving questions of whether the Court’s logic applies to private 
litigants seeking disgorgement relief. Its interpretative analysis and 
rationale, although coupled with the extreme dissatisfaction of dissenting 
voices on the Court, provide plenty of ammunition to fuel further 
scholarly debate and attract the attention of lawyers seeking 
disgorgement in private contract disputes. This Essay adds to my body of 
work on disgorgement by clarifying the contours of Kansas v. Nebraska 
and examining its ramifications for the law of contracts, remedies, and 
restitution. 
I.  THE DISGORGEMENT REMEDY 
Disgorgement is a bold, powerful remedy emerging as a novel 
expansion of American contract law. The remedy is not new, but its 
application in the context of contractual breach is bourgeoning. My larger 
body of work maintains that remedies shape rights. Disgorgement 
                                                                                                                     
(“Compact”). See id. at 1063. This Compact operated without incident for decades until a dispute 
arose, motivating Kansas to file an original cause of action in the Supreme Court. Id. at 1049. The 
Court referred the case to a Special Master for findings and recommendations. Id. at 1051. This 
resulted in a settlement agreement which, along with the Compact, is the subject of the 
controversy explored in this Essay. 
 6. Id. at 1049.  
 7. Id. at 1064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that section 39 
of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution “constitutes a ‘novel extension’ of the law that finds little 
if any support in case law” (quoting Caprice L. Roberts, Restitutionary Disgorgement for 
Opportunistic Breach of Contract and Mitigation of Damages, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 131, 134 
(2008))); id. at 1068–69 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). 
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exemplifies this thesis. Disgorgement of a contract breacher’s profits not 
only adds an alternative remedy to the traditional stable but also pushes 
the boundary of the underlying right and expands the contours of breach. 
Ultimately, disgorgement grounded in unjust enrichment offers a 
compelling rationale for expansion of contract law’s base, as long as 
principled discretion guides the application and scope of the remedy. 
To disgorge—to strip another of ill-gotten gains8—is not a novel 
concept. In fact, it is an ancient remedy rooted in restitution.9 
Disgorgement of a wrongdoer’s profits exists across varied causes of 
actions10 as well as continents.11 Historically, however, disgorgement has 
held no favor in conventional contract doctrine.12 The geography of 
contract remedy, much like a tectonic plate, is slowly but inexorably 
shifting. 
Remedies—and more specifically restitution-based remedies—
captivate the imagination because they exist at the crossroads of other 
bodies of law. This potential to bridge conventional doctrinal boundaries 
commands close attention. Disgorgement in particular warrants deeper 
analysis as it advances its unjust enrichment roots in novel contexts. One 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See LEGAL INFO. INST., Disgorgement, WEX, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
disgorgement (last visited July 31, 2016) (defining “disgorgement” as “a remedy requiring a party 
who profits from illegal or wrongful acts to give up any profits he or she made as a result of his 
or her illegal or wrongful conduct”). 
 9. See, e.g., William W. Goodrich, Restitution—A Modern Application of an Ancient 
Remedy, 9 FOOD, DRUG & COSM. L.J. 565, 566–67, 569 (1954) (advocating that federal district 
courts order “predatory entrepreneur[s]” to disgorge “unlawful gains” incident to the ancient 
doctrine of restitution stemming from Pomponius’s second-century pronouncement: “For this by 
nature is equitable, that no one be made richer through another’s loss”).  
 10. American courts utilize the disgorgement remedy in both common law and statutory 
contexts across a broad spectrum of breaches, for example, fiduciary duty, confidential 
information copyright, trademark, antitrust, and securities violations. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2011) (sanctioning a 
restitutionary disgorgement remedy to disgorge gains from a “conscious wrongdoer”). 
 11. See, e.g., ERNEST WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 158 (2012) (examining whether 
corrective justice goals were met in cases sanctioning disgorgement in Israel and in England). But 
cf. Acme Mills & Elevator Co. v. Johnson, 133 S.W. 784, 786 (Ky. 1911) (denying expectancy 
damages [time of breach minus contract price, which would have mimicked disgorgement of 
profits] despite the defendant’s breach by selling to a third party at a higher price than the contract 
price, because the plaintiff should have covered on the market at the time and place of delivery 
for less than the contract price and thus “benefited” by the breach). 
 12. See Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, You Do Have to Keep Your Promises: A 
Disgorgement Theory of Contract Remedies, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1181, 1181, 1184 (2011) 
(acknowledging the stronghold of conventional wisdom “universally accepted by scholars” of 
contract law’s Holmesian premise, with its default of the expectation remedy and omission of 
disgorgement). But see id. at 1184–85 (asserting that the conventional view “is radically 
wrong . . . across a wide range of circumstances” and that “standard contract doctrines do in fact 
require” people to keep their promises, or to disgorge their entire profit if they do not (emphasis 
added)).  
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such context is American contract law. Disgorgement furthers the 
deterrence of unjust enrichment. Its manner of prevention—stripping the 
wrongdoer of profit—draws contract law closer to tort goals. It also exists 
at the intersection of law and equity. If the doctrine and goals are clear, a 
restitution-based disgorgement remedy is a worthy addition to contract 
breach’s traditional arsenal of monetary relief, including expectation 
damages, reliance damages, and restitution. 
Why is there no history of disgorgement for breaches of contract? 
Conventional wisdom sets forth countless doctrines that leave little room 
for disgorgement: contract remedy may only compensate a plaintiff for 
her loss,13 contract law does not punish,14 and efficient breaches15 grease 
the wheels of (Pareto’s)16 commerce.17 The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts did not sanction a disgorgement remedy for breach of 
contracts.18 This was not a historical accident but likely a purposeful 
omission.19 Yet facts involving breach of contract have continued to give 
rise to an intuitive need for disgorgement, thereby providing an avenue 
for legal evolution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 149–50. 
 14. Id. at 148–49. 
 15. The doctrine of efficient breach encourages breach of contract where one party will 
profit more through breach, including the cost of paying damages, than through performance of 
its contractual promise. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed. 2010). 
 16. A Pareto improvement is possible if at least one person is better off while another is no 
worse off; the move is efficient until there is no move that improves one’s lot without depleting 
another’s, reaching Pareto optimality. See Pareto Optimality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). Pareto efficiency may be easier said than done. For a provocative critique of Pareto 
optimality that takes seriously Ronald Coase’s transaction costs, see generally Guido Calabresi, 
The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211 (1991). For an 
explanation of Coase’s theorem, see generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1960). 
 17. Roberts, supra note 7, at 158. 
 18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (listing available 
remedies with no mention of disgorgement). 
 19. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 105 MICH. L. REV. 
559, 560–61 (2006) (discussing Allen Farnsworth’s—as the Reporter for much of the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts—intentional omission of disgorgement as a viable breach of contract 
remedy from section 344’s exclusive catalog of remedies); see also id. at 561 (noting Professor 
Farnsworth’s normative opposition to the disgorgement interest in contract law, as evidenced in 
his leading article, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach 
of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339 (1985)). 
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The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment pushed 
disgorgement through the tiny crack in the door.20 Specifically, the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution approved a disgorgement of the 
wrongdoer’s profit from an opportunistic breach of contract21 where (i) 
the breach is deliberate, (ii) damages afford inadequate protection for the 
plaintiff’s contractual entitlement, and (iii) the breach is profitable.22 This 
section had little historical precedent in U.S. contract law.23 The limited 
citations stem from a few cases.24 Those cases, however, did not forge a 
                                                                                                                     
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AM. LAW INST. 
2011). More than a decade in the making, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution is impressive for 
its breadth across a host of doctrinal fields and its refinement of the substantive and remedial law 
of unjust enrichment and restitution.  
 21. Opportunism is not an element of the section, but rather a rhetorical device in the title 
as well as discussed in comments as a conscious advantage taking of another without permission. 
See id. § 39 cmt. b. 
 22. Id. § 39. 
 23. Conventional wisdom relied upon the Fuller and Perdue tri-part classification of 
monetary remedies for breach of contract: expectancy, reliance, and restitution. See L.L. Fuller & 
William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56 (1936). The 
restitution interest for breach of contract typically constituted a return of money paid (money had 
and received) or reasonable value for goods delivered (quantum valebant) or for services rendered 
(quantum meruit). RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 49. 
Restitution viewed more broadly includes other remedial forms including disgorgement of a 
defendant’s profits to undo unjust enrichment. See id. § 51. In recent years, casebook treatment 
has acknowledged that, although a gain-based remedy is unlikely for “mere breach of contract,” 
certain circumstances may enable a plaintiff to strip a defendant of profits pursuant to the 
disgorgement remedy. Compare the recent edition of JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES 
AND COMMENT 118 (10th ed. 2013) (exploring a disgorgement remedy alternative, including a 
pro-disgorgement precedent as a principal case, Watson v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1194–
95 (Colo. App. 2011), which quotes prominently EarthInfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, 
Inc., 900 P.2d 113, 119 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (“If . . . the [contract breaching party’s] 
wrongdoing is intentional or substantial, or there are no other means of measuring the wrongdoer’s 
enrichment, recovery of [the breaching party’s] profits may be granted.”)), with prior editions, for 
example, JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT xl, 934–36, 945 (9th ed. 
2008) (no inclusion of EarthInfo in the table of contents and no mention of disgorgement in the 
index, including no entry for disgorgement under “damages,” “equitable remedies,” “remedies” 
or “restitution”). 
 24. See, e.g., Laurin v. DeCarolis Constr. Co., 363 N.E.2d 675, 679 (Mass. 1977) (awarding 
a gain-based theory of recovery for breach of contract). The Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
recognizes the essential newness of the section authorizing disgorgement for opportunistic 
breaches of contract. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT pt. II, ch. 
4, introductory note. The Reporter asserted the disgorgement provision is justified based on a few 
foundational cases coupled with the rising tide of scholarly voices in favor of the remedy’s 
recognition. Id. reporter’s note a.  
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clear pathway regarding the cause of action,25 the remedy,26 or its 
contours.  
This Essay examines the Supreme Court’s recent endorsement of the 
disgorgement remedy in a breach of contract setting.27 Lower courts, state 
and federal, have begun applying disgorgement to certain contractual 
breaches.28 Those cases raise a host of questions about the law-equity 
divide, the intent required, and the reach of the remedy. Now, the 
Supreme Court speaks to endorse section 39 of the Restatement (Third) 
                                                                                                                     
 25. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1980) (authorizing an equitable 
constructive-trust remedy in favor of the government over ex-CIA agent’s book profits). Though 
Snepp permitted the government to disgorge the defendant’s gains through a constructive trust, 
the Supreme Court failed to articulate the exact right the remedy vindicated. See, e.g., Caprice L. 
Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1034 
n.34 (2011) (criticizing the Court’s lack of explanation, if not logic, for its right-to-remedy link). 
Professor Nicholas Sage draws the connection the Court failed to show in that he views Snepp (as 
well as its British counterpart, Attorney General v. Blake [2001] 1 A.C. 268 (H.L.)) as using a 
disgorgement-type remedy, in the form of constructive trust over unauthorized profit, for breach 
of a negative covenant:  
The promisee has the right that the promisor not perform any instance of the 
relevant type of act. Therefore, when the promisor performs an instance of the 
act, it is clear that the promisee’s rights and the promisor’s profitable action 
coincide. The profitable action is contrary to the promisee’s rights, and 
disgorgement may be available. 
Nicholas W. Sage, Disgorgement: From Property to Contract, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 244, 259 
(2016) (second emphasis added) (tying Snepp, Blake, and other negative covenant cases to the 
above-quoted analysis and in particular to Professor Sage’s thesis that a contract disgorgement 
remedy is available only to the extent the defendant’s profitable action contravenes the plaintiff’s 
right). Snepp violated the government’s contractual right, but Snepp’s profitable action may not 
have contravened that right. Snepp claimed the government admitted that his book contained no 
classified information, yet the Court could permit disgorgement of profits for Snepp’s breach of 
the negative covenant requiring prepublication clearance. The Court, however, did not trace the 
profit to the wrong: Thus, one could argue that the government was not entitled to earn the profit 
that Snepp made unless Snepp profited from publishing classified information. 
 26. See Laurin, 363 N.E.2d at 677. 
 27. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1064 (2015). 
 28. See, e.g., Hicks v. DLC, Inc., No. CJ-2009-02805, 2013 WL 3722308 (D. Okla. June 
19, 2013) (declining disgorgement for breach of professional covenant not to compete); Watson 
v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189 (Colo. App. 2011) (finding an award of disgorgement an 
appropriate remedy for a bad-faith, deliberate breach by a profiting loan guarantor); Motion to 
Reconsider, Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Cendent Corp., No. 303CV00029, 2008 WL 6582579 (D. 
Alaska Oct. 22, 2008) (seeking reconsideration of the court’s finding of insufficient proof of 
opportunism for a contractual disgorgement remedy). Disgorgement for breach of contract is on 
the rise and may be a logical extension of the reasons underlying proprietary disgorgement 
awards. See Sage, supra note 25, at 272 (arguing that his “new account of 
disgorgement . . . reveals that, in the emerging body of cases awarding or denying disgorgement 
for breach of contract, courts are maintaining an approach that has all along been implicit in their 
resolution of at least some cases of proprietary disgorgement”). 
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of Restitution’s disgorgement remedy for a breach of contract. For a 
variety of reasons, however, the reach of the Court’s endorsement is 
unclear. The quasi-public nature of the contract and related settlement 
agreement likely cloud the applicability of section 39 to generic contract 
claims.29 Such contracts technically morph into compacts because the 
Constitution requires that Congress approve agreements between states.30 
The limits on the holding include a law-equity distinction and the effects 
of the public context on the requisite intent to trigger access to 
disgorgement. The case may pose more questions than answers, 
especially for breach of purely private agreements.  
The ruling’s import is difficult to predict not simply because of the 
uniqueness of the case, but also given the Court’s track record. 
Specifically, the Court has a tortured history with restitution (and with 
several lines of remedies cases more broadly).31 Despite the complex 
terrain, the Court’s disgorgement ruling will add to what I have described 
as the restitution revival in the United States. Love or hate the ruling, it 
will be cited and debated, and courts may well look to its teachings for 
relevant extensions or limitations in private law. All of which will be 
fruitful for the law of restitution, contracts, and remedies. 
Contracts, remedies, and restitution scholars should look forward to 
seeing how this story unfolds. My continued prediction, as well as 
normative desire, is for a principled expansion of the body of contract 
law—one that honors the goal of preventing unjust enrichment by 
authorizing what may be the only meaningful remedy for specific 
instances of that wrong. 
II.  SUPREMELY DISGORGED AS A MATTER OF ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 
Kansas v. Nebraska will not generate as much buzz as controversial 
constitutional cases. As with any good sleeper, however, its effect may 
be profound. It arises as a matter of original jurisdiction,32 which is an 
                                                                                                                     
 29. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1058, 1062–63.  
 30. Id. at 1049. 
 31. I plan to compile these remedies errors in a forthcoming manuscript, The Supreme 
Court—Wrong on Remedies. See DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES—CASES 
& MATERIALS 493–94 (8th ed. 2011) (describing several myths and misstatements in judicial 
opinions regarding restitution); Doug Rendleman, Remedies—A Guide for the Perplexed, 57 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 567, 567 (2013) (noting that when the Court “deals with a federal issue in Remedies, 
the Court has been at best confusing, as in contempt, and at worst, wrongheaded and regressive, 
as in punitive damages” (footnote omitted)); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable 
Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 73, 76–77, 80 (2008) (accord 
with respect to the Supreme Court’s misguided, rigid, and inaccurate treatment of equitable 
considerations for injunctions). 
 32. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For a critical examination of the history of original 
jurisdiction over state-party cases and the need for its continuation and expansion, see generally 
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increasingly rare avenue onto the Supreme Court’s docket.33 It is a 
dispute over exceeding the allocation of water rights, pursuant to both an 
interstate agreement and a related settlement agreement.34 Both the basis 
of jurisdiction and the nature of the suit raise special considerations for 
the proceeding and its potential effect. 
A.  Original Jurisdiction and Equity 
Three main paths to the U.S. Supreme Court exist, the first of which 
is least used: (1) original jurisdiction, (2) review of a final judgment from 
the highest court of a state, and (3) review of a final judgment of a U.S. 
Court of Appeals.35 The exercise of original jurisdiction is rare.36 It 
involves cases initiated in the Supreme Court.37 Accordingly, the nature 
of the proceeding is unusual because the standard operation of the Court 
is overwhelmingly in its appellate, rather than its trial, capacity.38 
The rarity of the exercise stems from the limited scope of original 
jurisdiction. Jurisdictional power arises from Article III, which states, “In 
all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and 
those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have 
original jurisdiction.”39 Article III’s grant of original jurisdiction is 
supported by statutory authority as well.40 The statute provides, in 
                                                                                                                     
James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555 
(1994). 
 33. Though the Court possesses original jurisdiction over disputes between states, the Court 
has prudentially narrowed its jurisdiction over such cases under an appropriateness doctrine in 
which the Court evaluates the “seriousness and dignity of the claim[s]” and the availability of 
alternative forums and may decline jurisdiction to preserve its resources to resolve appeals 
involving federal questions. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972); see Vincent L. 
McKusick, Discretionary Gatekeeping: The Supreme Court’s Management of Its Original 
Jurisdiction Docket Since 1961, 45 ME. L. REV. 185, 187 (1993) (“The Founders may well have 
anticipated that original jurisdiction cases would be a major part of the Supreme Court’s workload. 
In fact, such cases have always been relatively few in number.”). 
 34. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1048. 
 35. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 695 (6th ed. 2012). 
 36. Gary S. Gildin, The Supreme Court’s Legislative Agenda to Free Government from 
Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PA. ST. L. REV. 1333, 1337 (2010).  
 37. Jurisdiction, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “original 
jurisdiction” as “a court’s power to hear and decide a matter before any other court can review the 
matter”). 
 38. For a general discussion of the division of labor among the federal courts (also versus 
state courts) and the nature of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, see Chapters 1 & 12 of 
MICHAEL P. ALLEN, MICHAEL FINCH & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, FEDERAL COURTS—CONTEXT, 
CASES, AND PROBLEMS 1–28, 851–56 (2d ed. 2015). 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 40. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012). This statutory authorization is superfluous, given the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article III as self-executing, and thus directly vests original 
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 (1963); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. 
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relevant part, “The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive 
jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more States.”41 Congress 
cannot expand the constitutional jurisdictional grant;42 rather, the list in 
Article III poses a ceiling of original jurisdiction for the Supreme Court.43 
Further, Congress cannot reduce the Court’s original jurisdiction, given 
the self-executing nature of Article III, which imbues the Court with 
original jurisdiction to “hear the cases despite the absence of statutory 
authority.”44 
Cases of original jurisdiction require the Supreme Court to function 
as a trial court.45 In reality, the Court is not equipped to operate smoothly 
as a trial court.46 Putting it bluntly, “[t]he Supreme Court lacks the time 
and resources to function effectively as a court of original jurisdiction.”47 
Early in the Court’s history, it intimated that the Article III category of 
original versus appellate jurisdiction is distinct.48 Before long, the Court 
altered course and ruled the Court could hear appeals of cases with the 
characteristics listed in the original jurisdiction clause.49 The Court 
signaled to Congress to grant concurrent jurisdiction over original 
jurisdiction matters to state and lower federal courts.50 The Court desired 
congressional relief from the burden of having to be the court of first 
                                                                                                                     
Co., 127 U.S. 265, 300 (1888); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 98 (1860); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 696 (asserting, and citing, the same). 
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a). The remainder of the statute provides: 
(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of: 
(1) All actions or proceedings to which ambassadors, other public ministers, 
consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states are parties; 
(2) All controversies between the United States and a State; 
(3) All actions or proceedings by a State against citizens of another State or 
against aliens. 
Id. § 1251(b). 
 42. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (invalidating, as an unconstitutional 
expansion of Article III’s grant of original jurisdiction, the Judiciary Act of 1789’s authorization 
of original jurisdiction over cases in which petitioner requests from the Supreme Court a writ of 
mandamus against a federal government officer); see also ALLEN, FINCH & ROBERTS, supra note 
38, at 854 (discussing this aspect of Marbury). 
 43. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 177–78; see also ALLEN, FINCH & ROBERTS, supra note 
38, at 166 fig. 3–1 (depicting Professor Chemerinsky’s floor-ceiling concept in a visual figure). 
 44. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 696 (asserting that congressional “subtractions [from 
original jurisdiction] are irrelevant”). 
 45. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.  
 46. ALLEN, FINCH & ROBERTS, supra note 38, at 855. 
 47. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 697. 
 48. Id. at 696–97 (interpreting Marbury). 
 49. Id.; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 392–405 (1821). 
 50. See, e.g., California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979); Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 
280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 697. 
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impression for all Article III original jurisdiction cases, and Congress 
listened.51 Accordingly, parties hardly ever seek original jurisdiction in 
the Court, and, when they do, the Court can exercise discretion to 
command that the case be refiled in state or lower federal court if 
concurrent jurisdiction lies.52 According to the Court, it may abdicate 
jurisdiction to secure the highest level of the Court’s “effective 
functioning” within the whole federal judicial system.53 
Thus, the cases that the Court keeps on its original jurisdiction docket 
are rare indeed. The Court’s docket houses only a few such cases in any 
given year.54 Further, the Court increasingly utilizes Special Masters, 
who handle trials on the merits and then issue findings of fact and 
recommendations to the Court for its rulings.55 Both the Court and the 
Special Masters, acting in the Court’s stead, operate under notions of 
equity stemming from the history of original jurisdiction cases.56  
All of this means such proceedings are unusual in both nature and 
frequency, and they likely involve heavy doses of discretion. This Essay 
embraces equitable discretion, as long as the Court exercises principled 
discretion in its reasoning and is supported by the Special Master. Here, 
the relevant Article III language is: “those [cases] in which a state shall 
be a party.”57 It turns out suits between two states is the only class of 
cases for which the Supreme Court must exercise its original 
jurisdiction.58 Thus, “it is hardly surprising that virtually all that are 
decided as a matter of original jurisdiction arise from actions between 
two or more states.”59 Alexander Hamilton rightly predicted that the point 
of such jurisdiction likely was to empower the Court to resolve boundary 
disputes between states.60 Similar cases of original jurisdiction for the 
Court involve state-to-state disputes over water rights, including cases 
regarding proper water allocation from interstate rivers.61 Such is the 
dispute in Kansas v. Nebraska.  
                                                                                                                     
 51. The current iteration of concurrent jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2012). 
 52. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 697. 
 53. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983). 
 54. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 698. 
 55. See infra note 71 (outlining the role, as well as scholarly criticism of the use, of Special 
Masters). 
 56. See infra Section II.C (examining the Court’s classification of the case as equitable as 
a matter of its tradition of original jurisdiction). 
 57. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 58. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 35, at 698. 
 59. Id. (citing CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 192 (1988)). 
 60. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 477–78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961)). 
 61. Id. at 699; see, e.g., Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 312 (1984); Nebraska v. 
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 591 (1945); see also Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 642 (1973) (river 
boundary dispute); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 228 (1901) (interstate water pollution 
dispute). 
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B.  The Extraordinary Ruling in Kansas v. Nebraska 
In Kansas v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court endorses a disgorgement 
remedy, ordering Nebraska to disgorge $1.8 million of its profits for 
breaching its water-rights compact with the state of Kansas.62 Justice 
Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.63 Justices Thomas and Scalia 
wrote separate largely dissenting opinions,64 primarily charging the Court 
with exceeding its equitable powers by following the Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution and creating a “‘novel extension’ of the law that finds little 
if any support in case law.”65  
The dispute stemmed from an agreement among Kansas, Nebraska, 
and Colorado over water rights to the “‘virgin water supply originating’ 
in the Republican River Basin.”66 Congress approved the agreement, the 
Republican River Compact, in 1943.67 Each signatory state received an 
annual water allocation, which included the counting of groundwater 
pumping depletions to the Basin’s stream flow.68 “All was smooth sailing 
                                                                                                                     
 62. 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1049–51, 1064 (2015). 
 63. Id. at 1048. 
 64. Id. at 1064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (writing separately to 
highlight the “questionable value” of Restatements that go beyond describing the law and to 
advise caution when using); id. at 1064–65, 1067 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). The reason for Justice Thomas’s concurrence primarily regards the Court’s denial of 
injunctive relief, as the Special Master recommended, and the Court’s finding that Nebraska acted 
knowingly rather than deliberately. Id. at 1064–65. 
 65. Id. at 1064 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Roberts, supra 
note 7, at 134); see also id. at 1064–69 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Roberts, supra note 7, at 134). Justices Scalia and Thomas rip my prediction from its 
context. In the cited article (which is one in a line of related articles), I do argue that restitutionary 
disgorgement extends conventional contract boundaries, but I advocate that disgorgement 
remedies and unjust enrichment principles would foster an environment in which actors operate 
conscientiously to mitigate avoidable consequences. Further, my foundational article on the novel 
nature of extending a disgorgement remedy to opportunistic contract breaches concluded: “But, 
in the end, a Trojan horse is a bad thing only if you want the Greeks to lose.” Caprice Roberts, 
Restitutionary Disgorgement as a Moral Compass for Breach of Contract, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 991, 
1026 (2009). 
 66. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1049 (explaining further the Compact’s definition of virgin river 
supply as “‘the water supply within the Basin,’ in both the River and its tributaries, ‘undepleted 
by the activities of man’”).  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 1049–50. A Ground Water Atlas for Kansas-Nebraska-Missouri (rather than 
Colorado) explains:  
The major rivers that drain these States are the Niobrara, the Platte, the Kansas, 
the Arkansas, and the Missouri; the Mississippi River is the eastern boundary of 
the area. These rivers supply water for many uses but ground water is the source 
of slightly more than one-half of the total water withdrawn for all uses within the 
three-State area.  
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for decades . . . .”69 Then, in 1998, Kansas complained to the Supreme 
Court in an original action that Nebraska’s increased pumping of 
groundwater exceeded the agreement.70 The Court appointed a Special 
Master,71 who agreed with Kansas’s factual interpretation—a 
determination with which the Court summarily agreed.72 Upon remand, 
the dispute resulted in negotiations to agree on the best method of 
measurement and accounting.73 Ultimately, the discussions resulted in a 
2002 settlement agreement.74 
By 2007, both states had concerns about the operation of the 
settlement agreement’s parameters.75 Kansas claimed that, during the 
2005–2006 accounting period, Nebraska “substantially exceeded” the 
proper allocation of water.76 Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the 
states entered into non-binding arbitration, which proved fruitless.77 
Kansas next sought monetary and injunctive relief in the Supreme Court, 
which again referred the case to a Special Master.78 
For two years, the Special Master heard evidence and legal arguments 
regarding Nebraska’s alleged breach and ultimately issued his report and 
                                                                                                                     
JAMES A. MILLER & CYNTHIA L. APPEL, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND WATER ATLAS OF 
THE UNITED STATES: SEGMENT 3, at D2 (1997), http://pubs.usgs.gov/ha/730d/report.pdf. 
 69. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1049. 
 70. Id. at 1049–50. 
 71. Id. at 1050. The Supreme Court using Special Masters is common in its exercise of 
original jurisdiction, but it is not without controversy. See generally Anne-Marie C. Carstens, 
Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme Court’s Original 
Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002) (exploring the expanding role of the 
Supreme Court’s use of Special Masters and suggesting reforms). The increase of use and 
expansion of the scope of power of Special Masters warrant close attention: 
The Court delegates many of its trial functions to Special Masters, who are 
neither elected nor appointed by an elected body . . . . [T]he Court has delegated 
greater pockets of its fact-finding and its legal decision-making authority in 
original jurisdiction cases to Special Masters, who sometimes have little or no 
judicial experience and who embark on their duties with limited guidance or 
oversight from the Court. 
Id. at 627–28. 
 72. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1050. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. The settlement agreement “charged Nebraska for its depletion of the Basin’s stream 
flow due to groundwater pumping—an amount the State had not previously counted toward its 
allotment,” but provided a multi-year averaging system to allow Nebraska sufficient time to 
achieve the required reductions. Id. at 1054. 
 75. Id. at 1050. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 1050–51. 
 78. Id. at 1051. 
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recommendations.79 The report concluded that “Nebraska had 
‘knowingly failed’ to comply with the Compact in the 2005–2006 
accounting period, by consuming 70,869 acre-feet of water in excess of 
its prescribed share.”80 He recommended compensatory relief and 
disgorgement to remedy the breach, but denied Kansas’s requested 
injunctive relief.81 The proposed award included $3.7 million to Kansas 
for its loss and an additional $1.8 million in partial disgorgement of 
Nebraska’s profits from the breach.82 Both Kansas and Nebraska filed 
exceptions to the report.83  
Nebraska disagreed with the finding of “knowing” breach as well as 
the recommendation in favor of partial disgorgement.84 Meanwhile, 
Kansas pressed its case for a larger disgorgement and injunctive relief, 
and objected to Nebraska’s suggested revision to the Accounting 
Procedures.85 The Supreme Court gave the Special Master’s factual 
findings “respect and a tacit presumption of correctness,” but 
independently reviewed the record, assuming “the ultimate responsibility 
for deciding” all issues.86 Ultimately, the Court adopted the Special 
Master’s recommendations and (i) ordered  partial disgorgement of $1.8 
million,87 (ii) denied injunctive relief,88 and (iii) revised the accounting 
procedures to conform to the parties’ agreements.89 
C.  The Equitable Side of the Law-Equity Divide 
Disgorgement never solidified as a pure equitable or legal remedy. 
Rulings are inconsistent given the functional appearance of disgorgement 
as a monetary award. The Restatement (Third) of Restitution classifies 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. Id. Kansas requested injunctive relief ordering Nebraska to follow the Compact and 
settlement, which would then lead to contempt sanctions for future noncompliance. Id. at 1059. 
The Special Master did recommend revised accounting procedures pursuant to Nebraska’s 
demand that it not be charged for “‘imported water’—that is, water farmers bring into the area 
(usually for irrigation) that eventually seeps into the Republican River.” Id. at 1050.  
 82. Id. at 1051. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (quoting Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 317 (1984)). 
 87. Id. at 1051, 1064. 
 88. Id. at 1051, 1059. 
 89. Id. at 1051, 1063–64 (acknowledging some lament about the parties’ inability to resolve 
this essentially agreement-interpretation dispute but ultimately amending the accounting 
procedures to “no longer charge Nebraska for imported water”). But see id. at 1065 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the majority “invents a new theory of 
contract reformation to rewrite the agreed-upon terms of that contract”). 
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the disgorgement remedy as legal.90 Most courts, however, view 
disgorgement as equitable given its historical affiliation with the 
equitable remedy of accounting.91 
In Kansas v. Nebraska, the Court reinforced the equity classification 
because the Court began with the premise that it was operating in equity 
incident to its original jurisdiction,92 stemming explicitly from the 
Constitution.93 Without examining the remedies at issue, the Supreme 
Court declared that it operated in equity by nature of the jurisdiction for 
the controversy. It pronounced: “Proceedings under that grant of 
jurisdiction are ‘basically equitable in nature.’”94 The rationale was that 
such jurisdiction authorizes a role different from the Court’s role in 
private controversies, where instead the Court acts as a diplomatic 
settlement authority to resolve disputes between two sovereigns.95 
Given the special nature of this role, the Court may craft the process 
and relief to “best promote the purposes of justice.”96 The Court bolstered 
the “essentially equitable character of [its] charge” based on the subject 
matter of the Compact and the settlement agreement—rights to an 
interstate waterway—as well as the Compact’s heightened status of 
federal law.97 Without the power of one state to resort to war between 
another, the state is left with the judicial power to halt the “inequitable 
taking of water” by utilizing the Court’s “equitable apportionment 
power.”98 
Though this equitable posture is flexible, the Court is not without 
admitted limits. In fashioning a remedy designed to stop abuse, the Court 
must fairly and consistently interpret the Compact and its express terms.99 
No sooner did the Court explain the boundaries than it reiterated the 
expanse of its power in this public versus pure private sphere: both 
broader and more flexible in the public realm, especially when using 
equity power to render complete justice.100 
                                                                                                                     
 90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT II 4 Intro. Note (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011).  
 91. See, e.g., Thel & Siegelman, supra note 12, at 1201 (equating disgorgement to the 
ancillary equitable remedy of accounting of profits rooted in restitution keyed to the defendant’s 
gain rather than damages tied to compensating the plaintiff’s loss). 
 92. 135 S. Ct. at 1051. 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 94. 135 S. Ct. at 1051 (quoting Ohio v. Kentucky, 410 U.S. 641, 648 (1973)). 
 95. Id. at 1051–52. 
 96. Id. at 1052 (quoting Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 98 (1861)). 
 97. Id. at 1052–53. 
 98. Id. at 1052. 
 99. Id. at 1052 & n.4 (“Far from claiming the power to alter a compact to fit our own views 
of fairness, we insist only upon broad remedial authority to enforce the Compact’s terms and deter 
future violations.”). 
 100. Id. at 1053 (citing a string of cases about the broad equitable powers to further the public 
interest). The dissent critiques the Court for applying precedents regarding sovereign rather than 
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The equitable classification, as it applies to disgorgement, is not 
wholly consistent with other Supreme Court cases, which treat restitution 
inconsistently and sometimes incorrectly.101 Some of the confusion stems 
from using equity interchangeably with notions of justice and fairness. 
Genuine confusion persists because restitution can be legal, equitable, 
and sometimes both.102 On that basis, an argument can be made for 
categorizing disgorgement as legal.103 The distinction matters because of 
the Seventh Amendment right (and comparable state constitutional 
rights) to a jury trial.104 Under a functional remedies test,105 some may 
see disgorgement as appearing aligned with monetarily relief and thus 
legal. However, given the basis for original jurisdiction as well as the 
history of the disgorgement remedy, others may focus on the history of 
the cause of action to support the equitable frame, as Justice Thomas did 
in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.106  
For now, equity it is. As such, the constitutional right to a jury trial 
does not extend to contract-based disgorgement claims. Further, an 
equitable classification brings with it language of discretion and 
creativity to render full relief. Equitable fashioning of relief may bypass 
traditional limitations on the right and the remedy. 
                                                                                                                     
water rights. Id. at 1066 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority 
retorts that the Framers purposefully required congressional approval of such compacts and that 
this “choice means that the judicial authority we have recognized to give effect to, and remedy 
violations of, federal law fully attends a compact.” Id. at 1053 n.5 (majority opinion). 
 101. Roberts, supra note 25, at 1039 n.69 (providing examples of Supreme Court cases 
conflating legal and equitable restitution as well as restitution and damages).  
 102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2011) (“Liabilities and remedies within the law of restitution and unjust enrichment may 
have originated in law, in equity, or in a combination of the two.”). 
 103. See Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
ONLINE 1, 12 (2013). 
 104. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.”); see, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 105. Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable Discretion, 
15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1422–23 (2015) (explaining that a more functional analysis of the jury trial 
right examines the remedy sought rather than legal history). This test, popular among remedies 
scholars, would simply analyze the form of relief: money (in rem relief) versus an order operating 
on the defendant (in personam). Id. at 1423. That said, no solution is perfect, as many remedies 
historically categorized as legal or at-law remedies are non-monetary—including the writ of 
mandamus, replevin, and habeas corpus. See Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 
63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 593 (2016) (“Not all remedies that compel action or inaction are within 
the system [of equitable remedies], for mandamus, habeas, replevin, and ejectment are classically 
legal remedies.”). 
 106. 523 U.S. 340, 347–55 (1998); see Roberts, supra note 25, at 1030–32 (examining the 
elusive nature of the merger of law and equity given the constitutional right to a jury trial, 
especially for extensions of ancient remedies to evolving conceptions of wrongs within the hybrid 
context of contracts and restitution at the borderland of torts). 
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D.  Assessing Intent: Knowing Breach Suffices 
Conventional contract wisdom, per Justice Holmes, reinforces 
freedom of contract because it includes an option to perform or breach if 
a party is prepared to pay the consequences: “The duty to keep a contract 
at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do 
not keep it, — and nothing else.”107 Also, under American law’s 
traditional approach, breach of contract is a strict liability action.108 The 
question is whether a defendant breached—not why or how.109 
Nebraska conceded breach and the corresponding compensatory 
harm.110 Ordinarily, this would be the end of the road, whether for a 
breach of contract or even for a breach of compact claim. But Kansas 
argued that the Court should award disgorgement pursuant to restitution 
principles.111 The Special Master and the Court agreed.112 The ruling is 
controversial in two respects: (i) it assesses intent,113 deeming a knowing 
breach sufficient, and (ii) it exceeds compensatory relief by permitting 
disgorgement. 
Nebraska specifically admitted that it exceeded its allotted 
apportionment of water rights under the Compact by approximately 
seventeen percent.114 It denied, however, that it engaged in wrongful 
behavior in terms of the Special Master’s finding of intent: knowing 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897); see 
Roberts, supra note 7 (examining whether a restitutionary disgorgement remedy for opportunistic 
breach of contract is compatible with conventional contract doctrines such as the Holmesian 
choice principle). Justice Holmes’s normative intent is debatable, though one plausible extension 
of the logic lays the foundation for encouraging efficient breach. Efficient breach proponents 
favor contract doctrine that promotes efficient breach, while others maintain efficient breach is so 
“very rare” as to be “largely a red herring.” Thel & Siegelman, supra note 12, at 1187. 
 108. Curtis Bridgeman, Reconciling Strict Liability with Corrective Justice in Contract Law, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3013, 3016–17 (2007).  
 109. For a provocative argument that willful breach cases exist but that focus should not be 
on injury, but rather on whether the promise was one undertaken ex ante, with an understanding 
that one would not breach and therefore should be more authentically treated as breaches to be 
prevented or deterred, see generally Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, Willfulness Versus 
Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense of Willful Breach Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 
1518 (2009). 
 110. Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1049 (2015).  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id.  
 113. To be clear, contract law conventionally does not focus on intent regarding breaches, 
though it considers intent with respect to other limited facets of contract doctrine such as: good 
faith, mitigation, material breach, and more. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-304 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. 
LAW COMM’N 1977) (imposing a good-faith obligation in performance and enforcement of 
agreements); Rockingham Cty. v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301, 308 (4th Cir. 1929) (applying 
a duty of mitigation on a nonbreaching party to halt avoidable damages); Wood v. Lucy, 118 N.E. 
214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (implying a duty of good faith into an exclusive agency contract). 
 114. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1053. 
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breach.115 Nebraska further argued that additional recovery in the form of 
disgorgement could not stand, though it conceded compensatory harm in 
the amount of $3.7 million for Kansas’s losses.116 
The Court rejected all of Nebraska’s contentions regarding these 
points. Regarding intent, the Court endorsed the Special Master’s finding, 
noting ample support in the record: “Nebraska failed to put in place 
adequate mechanisms for staying within its allotment in the face of a 
known substantial risk that it would otherwise violate Kansas’s rights.”117 
Notably, the Court remarked that the evidence showed Nebraska’s efforts 
were “too late” and “too little.”118 Nebraska, according to the Court, could 
see the writing on the wall: anticipating breach, and acting with that 
knowledge, “Nebraska began purchasing its farmers’ rights to surface 
water in order to mitigate its anticipated breach.”119 Nebraska knew of 
the likelihood of breach from the moment of the settlement agreement’s 
execution, but proceeded regardless “straight toward a Compact 
violation.”120 Accordingly, the Court adopted the Special Master’s 
conclusion on Nebraska’s intent: it “knowingly exposed Kansas to a 
substantial risk” of yielding less than the Compact apportioned, and thus 
Nebraska “knowingly failed” to comport with the settlement agreement’s 
obligations.121 The Court also endorsed the Special Master’s finding of 
“reckless indifference” to compliance, or in the Court’s own 
characterization: “Nebraska recklessly gambled with Kansas’s rights, 
consciously disregarding a substantial probability that its actions would 
deprive Kansas of the water to which it was entitled.”122 
The Court’s framing is intriguing because, much like disgorgement 
for opportunistic breach of contract in the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution, the framing relies upon words of intent more familiar in the 
torts arena: recklessness and conscious disregard for the rights of another. 
The comments to the Restatement (Third) of Restitution describe the type 
of opportunistic breach required for disgorgement as “conscious 
                                                                                                                     
 115. Id. at 1054. Nebraska maintains that it “could not have known” about its earlier 
noncompliance and that it took “persistent and earnest” steps to comply. Id.  
 116. Id. at 1053. 
 117. Id. at 1054. In fact, Nebraska’s “overuse of Republican River water actually rose 
significantly from 2003 through 2005, making compliance at the eventual day of reckoning ever 
more difficult to achieve.” Id. at 1055. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. This effort to mitigate, however, “fell woefully short” in the Special Master’s 
opinion. Id.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 1056. 
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advantage-taking.”123 In contractual contexts, the wrong being committed 
must be something more than simple breach of a promise. Rather, in 
determining whether disgorgement is appropriate, a court must also look 
to the method of the breach—the how and the why. It is the lack of 
correlation of the traditional remedies to this type of wrong that inspires 
the Court to permit an extra-compensatory disgorgement award. 
E.  Exceeding Compensation but Deterring Opportunism  
The Court approved the Special Master’s recommendation for partial 
disgorgement of Nebraska’s profits.124 The ruling relied on extensive 
evidence from which the Special Master justified extra-compensatory 
relief. In particular, the Special Master found that the excess acre-foot of 
water was “substantially more valuable” on Nebraska’s farmland than on 
Kansas’s and thus that Nebraska’s “reward for breaching” far exceeded—
“likely by more than several multiples”—Kansas’s loss.125 As a result, 
the Special Master ordered, and the Court approved, Nebraska to disgorge 
part of its gain in the amount of $1.8 million.126 The recommendation 
noted the broad remedial authority in state-to-state disputes over federal 
law, here the Compact.127 
Again, Nebraska asserted error based on its asserted lack of 
deliberateness.128 For support, Nebraska invoked the Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution’s authorization of disgorgement for opportunistic breaches 
of contract only on a finding of a deliberate act.129 Nebraska further 
maintained that the Special Master’s finding of “knowing” action did not 
rise to the level of showing that Nebraska officials “deliberately set out 
to violate the Compact.”130 
The Court roundly rejected Nebraska’s position as “fail[ing] to come 
to terms with what the [Special] Master properly understood as the 
wrongful nature of Nebraska’s conduct.”131 In a twist of argument, the 
Court then used the Restatement (Third) of Restitution to refute 
Nebraska’s theory that “knowingly” falls too short of deliberateness: 
                                                                                                                     
 123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. b (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (“In countering this form of opportunism, the rule of § 39 reinforces the 
contractual position of the vulnerable party and condemns a form of conscious advantage-taking 
that is the equivalent, in the contractual context, of an intentional and profitable tort.”). 
 124. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1049. 
 125. Id. at 1056. 
 126. Id. at 1056–58. 
 127. Id. at 1056. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (“[A] deliberate breach of contract results in profit to the defaulting promisor.” 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT section 39(1))). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
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“And indeed, the very Restatement Nebraska relies on treats the two 
similarly. It assimilates ‘deliberate[ness]’ to ‘conscious wrongdoing,’ 
which it defines as acting (as Nebraska did) ‘despite a known risk that the 
conduct . . . violates [another’s] rights.’”132 
This reasoning follows the logic of the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution for awarding disgorgement for certain types of breaches: 
those that involve conscious wrongdoing by proceeding in the face of a 
known risk of breach. Still, the Court’s holding is not a straightforward 
application of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution, because of the non-
private contract law setting. To be clear, the Court cabined its 
interpretation with a turn of phrase, “And whatever is true of a private 
contract action”133—leaving application to private contracts an open 
question. It then pivoted to the public nature of the dispute, the rights at 
stake, and the type of breach. The Court bolstered its grounds by 
highlighting the heightened justification for the relief—“the case for 
disgorgement becomes still stronger when one State gambles with 
another State’s rights to a scarce natural resource.”134 Ultimately, the 
Court deemed the order of partial disgorgement of Nebraska’s gains “fair 
and equitable” in order “to stabilize a compact and deter future breaches,” 
as Kansas proved Nebraska’s “reckless disregard” of Kansas’s rights 
under the Compact and the settlement agreement.135  
The Court also struck a blow to the Holmesian principle and efficient 
breach theory as they operate within conventional contract doctrine.136 
By finding the water more valuable to Nebraska’s farmland than 
Kansas’s, the Court noted the reality under conventional doctrine means 
“Nebraska can take water that under the Compact should go to Kansas, 
pay Kansas actual damages, and still come out ahead.”137 Accordingly, 
the Court reasoned the traditional doctrine, coupled with Nebraska’s 
“favorable position,” created “a recipe for breach” that “Nebraska took 
full advantage of” to exceed its allowance.138 The Court would not let this 
result stand, despite the fact that the disgorgement award would exceed 
                                                                                                                     
 132. Id. at 1056–57 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT §§ 39 cmt. f,  51(3)(b)) (alterations in original). Further, the Court notes that the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution instead distinguishes inadvertent behavior (not like 
Nebraska’s) from deliberateness. Id. at 1057. 
 133.  Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. But cf. Thel & Siegelman, supra note 12, at 1202 (“Disgorgement remedies will likely 
have only second-order effects on the incidence of efficient nonperformance of contracts, 
although they will of course alter the distribution of gains that result when a better alternative to 
performing arises.”).  
 137. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1057. 
 138. Id. 
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compensatory goals. The Court justified its ruling on three principles: 
reinforcing legal obligations,139 deterring future breaches, and advancing 
effective administration of the Compact.140 
Assuming Nebraska had the ability to put the water allocated for 
Kansas to better use, the question becomes—Should the law encourage 
the breach? As a matter of economic efficiency, Nebraska’s use of 
Kansas’s water allocation benefitted more people than Kansas’s use of 
the water would have. Per Pareto,141 Nebraska would be better off (as 
would those benefitting from the crops Nebraska grew as a result) and 
Kansas would be no worse off. This argument assumes that Nebraska 
would compensate Kansas for its loss.142 Now recall that Nebraska 
conceded compensatory damages.143 Should compensatory damages for 
Kansas’s losses resulting from Nebraska’s breach suffice? The Court said 
no. It then authorized disgorgement to service other goals.144 
                                                                                                                     
 139. During a faculty colloquium at West Virginia University College of Law, Professor 
James Friedberg suggested this argument harkens the Roman concept of pacta sunt servanda—
agreements are to be kept—that remains relevant in international law and, more generally, in civil 
law jurisdictions (including Louisiana). See Hans Wehberg, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 775, 775 (1959) (“Few rules for the ordering of Society have such a deep moral and religious 
influence as the principle of the sanctity of contracts: Pacta sunt servanda. . . . The juridical sense 
of the Romans recognized that a well-regulated trade was possible only if contracts were kept. 
Then, as earlier, contracts were considered as being under Divine protection.”); see also Roberts, 
supra note 7 (examining moral influences supporting a restitutionary disgorgement remedy). For 
a discussion of the meaning of pacta sunt servanda, see Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A 
Meditation, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 405 (1994); Josef L. Kunz, The Meaning and the Range of the Norm 
Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 180 (1945); and Malcolm P. Sharp, Pacta Sunt Servanda, 
41 COLUM. L. REV. 783 (1941). For a productive discussion of Louisiana’s impossibility excuse 
to contracts, see Charles Tabor, Dusting off the Code: Using History to Find Equity in Louisiana 
Contract Law, 68 LA. L. REV. 549, 553 (2008) (“This strict adherence to contractual terms is the 
product of centuries of legal development and is also called pacta sunt servanda (‘contracts must 
be honored’).”). Compare Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 
120 HARV. L. REV. 708, 722–26 (2007) (arguing that contract law diverges from morality in that 
it defaults to an expectation remedy rather than specific performance and places the duty of 
mitigation on the nonbreaching party), with Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and 
Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 4–5 (2007) (debunking the foil of instrumental theorists against 
whom Professor Shiffrin pushes that “invoke far too crude a conception of morality”—doggedly 
keeping bargains—as opposed to reality of promising as “a human institution—albeit a moral 
one—in which human beings invoke mutual trust and mutual respect to accomplish the human 
purposes of one or both of them”). 
 140. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1064. 
 141. See supra note 16.  
 142. A Kaldor–Hicks improvement extends Pareto efficiency for reallocation even if the 
better-off party could only hypothetically compensate the worse-off party. See generally John 
Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare 
Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
 143. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1049.  
 144. Id. at 1064.  
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Regardless of the Court’s justifications, is the award of disgorgement 
duplicative when granted in addition to compensatory damages? This 
restitution-based remedy, as supported by the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution, permits “disgorgement of profits [a]s an alternative to 
liability for contract damages measured by injury to the promissee.”145 
Accordingly, it is extraordinary for a plaintiff to receive both 
compensatory damages and disgorgement of part of a defendant’s gains 
beyond the injury. Therefore, although it disavows punishment, 
disgorgement moves beyond compensation to deterrence. 
The availability of disgorgement, as envisioned by the American Law 
Institute, would encourage a party contemplating breach to think twice 
and consider negotiating with the other party before breaching.146 
Accordingly, before the Court’s Kansas v. Nebraska ruling, Nebraska 
calculated the risk and chose the efficiency of breach because the benefits 
outweighed the anticipated, traditional liability: it prepared to pay only 
compensatory harm. And away it breached, prepared to defend against 
litigation if need be. Conventional wisdom would have yielded a purely 
compensatory award without disgorgement. In that universe, the breach 
would have been efficient: Nebraska would have profited nicely, 
compensated Kansas, and put the water to better use.  
Yet a disgorgement ruling does not mean that efficient breach must be 
erased. Not every breach is alike. Even efficient breaches vary.147 Nor is 
                                                                                                                     
 145. Watson v. Cal-Three, LLC, 254 P.3d 1189, 1195 (Colo. App. 2011). Conventional 
adherents of contract doctrine may view disgorgement as unnecessary given other equitable 
remedies, but in some breaches injunctive, specific performance, and other ancillary equitable 
relief may be unattainable due to timing or other functional barriers. 
 146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 cmt. b (AM. 
LAW INST. 2011) (“The opportunistic calculation in either setting is that the wrongdoer’s 
anticipated liability in damages is less than the anticipated cost of the entitlement, were it to be 
purchased from the claimant in a voluntary transaction. Restitution (through the disgorgement 
remedy) seeks to defeat this calculation, reducing the likelihood that the conscious disregard of 
another’s entitlement can be more advantageous than its negotiated acquisition.”). 
 147. See Gregory Klass, The Rules of the Game and the Morality of Efficient Breach, 29 
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 1), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2734272 
(arguing for a nuanced theory of efficient breach in which “some breaches are good things, 
and . . . contract remedies are designed to encourage them,” while remedies should deter other 
breaches, even though efficient, because the breach is contrary to the parties’ understanding from 
the beginning). Professor Klass analogizes subclasses of efficient breach to Jean Renoir’s 1939 
film, La Règle du Jeu [The Rules of the Game] about French norms regarding the permissibility 
of marital promiscuity as long as it is properly done. Id. (manuscript at 2). He differentiates 
breaches between sophisticated parties that understand the nature of the game and will take care 
of themselves versus those who do not understand or wish to be bound by the rules of efficient 
breach. Id. (manuscript at 36). For sophisticated parties who contemplate the possibility and 
desirability of breach from the start, they enter contracts anticipating and even permitting certain 
breaches. Id. (manuscript at 12). The core notion of efficient breach is that payment of damages 
negates the broken promise. Id. (manuscript at 29). Further, sophisticated bargainers can handle 
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disgorgement available or proper for every breach of contract, efficient 
or not. Disgorgement makes profiting more difficult because the 
breaching party risks losing all profit, and thus disgorgement alters 
incentives.148 Still the availability of disgorgement may simply reallocate 
the resource and force profit sharing if the breaching party opts to 
negotiate in advance. For example, after the Court’s Kansas v. Nebraska 
ruling, with its grant of compensation plus partial disgorgement, a party 
like Nebraska would be wise to negotiate ex ante with Kansas—at the 
time of contract or in advance of breach—to alter the Compact allocation 
(and related settlement agreement) based upon its argument for a more 
beneficial allocation of resources. At the front end, a party like Kansas 
might have incentives to negotiate reasonably because disgorgement as a 
remedy is still developing. Even if precedent authorizing disgorgement 
exists, the hurdles to obtaining a grant of disgorgement at all (including 
a possible inadequacy showing and meeting intent thresholds) are real. 
  
                                                                                                                     
the risks, calibrate consideration, and avoid opportunistism. Id. (manuscript at 36). Alternatively, 
one-sided opportunism between unequal bargainers involves one party who purposely takes 
advantage of the other’s weakness such that the breach redistributes gains to himself without 
increasing the gains of both parties. Id. (manuscript at 18) (noting that for such conscious 
advantage taking “‘we might as well throw the book at [him]’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 105 (3d ed. 1986))). As an example, Professor 
Klass offers Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), in which the 
breaching party removed minimal coal from the Peevyhouse farm, but rerouted a creek onto the 
property to mine elsewhere. Professor Klass suggests the court capped damages at $300 
diminution in value to show the disjoint between the parties’ views about contract performance: 
the Peevyhouses thought the contract equaled a commitment to perform rather than a choice to 
perform or pay damages, while Garland likely believed the parties contemplated the choice. Id. 
(manuscript at 36–38). His argument poses an interesting interpretation, though the Peevyhouse 
court confronted a statutory cap on damages, which would apply to sophisticated and 
unsophisticated parties alike. In sum, Professor Klass maintains “the principles that support 
efficient breach also entail that there are right and wrong ways to efficiently breach a contract.” 
Id. (manuscript at 18). 
 148. Id. (manuscript at 9) (“The art of cheating . . . is the taking of calculated risks. The 
sophisticated cheater weighs the possible gains of a transgression against the penalties should she 
be caught, and transgresses only when doing so is a good bet.”). Consider Judge Posner’s 
prediction of potential recalibration of incentives after an equitable injunctive award permanently 
enforces an exclusivity clause in a lease where landlord agreed not to lease to a competitor 
pharmacy. If damages to the original pharmacy are smaller than the gain to the landlord from also 
leasing to the second pharmacy in the same mall property, “then there must be a price for 
dissolving the injunction that will make both parties better off.” Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Prop. 
Co., 966 F.2d 273, 275, 278–79 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming permanent injunction, while theorizing 
efficient maneuvers available even ex post). 
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F.  Inadequacy Revisited 
The concept of inadequacy of legal remedies is a waning historical 
barrier to equitable relief.149 Although the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution abandons the inadequacy requirement for all restitution 
remedies,150 the disgorgement provision uses insufficiency language that 
evokes the concept of inadequacy. The Court addressed this issue in a 
footnote about ensuring future compliance and implicitly tracked the 
Restatement (Third) of Restitution’s requirement that available remedies 
be insufficient to protect a plaintiff’s entitlement.151 The Court explained 
the barriers to specific performance involving water, which include 
feasibility issues and tricky questions about delivery, timing, and 
location.152 Though the Court did not cite the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution here, or use words of inadequacy or insufficiency,153 the Court 
appeared to find strength in the imperfection of a specific performance 
award (and presumably viewed such an award as similarly warranted 
when more feasible and manageable). The Court did not, however, appear 
to view this inadequacy step as a requirement to awarding disgorgement 
relief. In conclusion on this point, the Court simply stated the Special 
Master properly “found another way of preventing knowing 
misbehavior.”154 The Court also eventually adopted the denial of 
injunctive relief, given insufficient evidence of the “cognizable danger of 
recurrent violation,”155 but noted that in the event of further breach, 
Nebraska “may again be subject to disgorgement of gains—either in part 
or in full, as the equities warrant.”156 A deterrent effect indeed. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 149. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 4–5 (1991); 
Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 694 (1990). 
See generally Bray, supra note 105 (discussing the requirement of a plaintiff to show that legal 
remedies are inadequate to receive an equitable remedy). 
 150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4. See also Douglas 
Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 931 (2012) (noting the 
Restatement (Third) “explicitly stat[es] that no remedy for unjust enrichment requires a showing 
that legal remedies are inadequate”). 
 151. See Kansas v. Nebraska, 135 S. Ct. 1042, 1057 n.8 (2015).  
 152. Id. 
 153. See id.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 1059 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).  
 156. Id. The Court acknowledged the powerful effect of an order of disgorgement coupled 
with a threat of future disgorgement orders: “That, we trust, will adequately guard against 
Nebraska’s repeating its former practices.” Id. This sentiment expresses why a simple 
compensatory award would not have sufficed in the Court’s eyes. 
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G.  Measuring Disgorgement 
This Essay argues in favor of building a road to disgorgement for 
breach of contract in both the public and private sphere. Unfortunately, 
in Kansas v. Nebraska, the Special Master did not elaborate on the 
selection of the ultimate number, $1.8 million, which stripped from 
Nebraska part but not all its profits from breach.157 Because the Court 
exercised an unrefined approach to measuring the remedy, its 
endorsement of the recommended award sends an imperfect signal to 
other courts about the utility of disgorgement. The Court simply approved 
a partial-disgorgement award that appeared to be somewhat at the Special 
Master’s whim. It is unclear if the shortcoming is based on a lack of 
explanation or a lack of evidentiary basis. For the equitable principles 
behind disgorgement to maintain credibility, it is essential that judicial 
opinions advancing disgorgement provide reasoned elaboration and 
causally link the remedy amount to the harm caused and the right 
breached.  
If Nebraska thought the disgorgement award unjustified as 
inapplicable and too high, Kansas responded by asserting the award was 
too low to encourage future compliance.158 The Court reinforced its 
power to fashion partial disgorgement relief pursuant to a flexible 
balancing of hardships,159 but it quickly rejected Kansas’s attempts to get 
to a higher number. Here, the Court ruled, the “relatively small 
disgorgement award suffices” based on Nebraska’s ameliorative and 
compliant efforts after the 2006 breach.160 The Court did express some 
frustration with the Special Master’s lack of explanation161 but in the end 
approved the $1.8 million disgorgement order even while acknowledging 
its arguably “random” selection.162 
This arguable randomness inadequately guides other courts’ exercise 
of discretion. The opinion also lacks any meaningful causation analysis. 
In other words, if Nebraska wrongfully took advantage of Kansas by 
seizing an opportunity to profit that Kansas had the right to take, why 
should Kansas not receive more? The irony is that if Kansas had received 
                                                                                                                     
 157. See id.  
 158. Id. at 1056–58. Kansas acknowledged that the Court could choose a “fair point” 
between disgorging all profits versus no profits based on the totality of circumstances. Id. at 1058. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 1059 (“Truth be told, we cannot be sure why the [Special] Master selected the 
exact number he did . . . rather than a little more or a little less. The Master’s Report, in this single 
respect, contains less explanation than we might like. But then again, any hard number reflecting 
a balance of equities can seem random in a certain light—as Kansas’s own briefs, with their ever-
fluctuating ideas for a disgorgement award, amply attest.”). 
 162. Id.  
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its entitlement—a full allocation of its water rights—Kansas’s farmland 
would have been less viable and thus presumably less profitable. Thus, 
the Special Master likely used silence to mask what was in fact his gut 
assessment of what seemed like a fair number based on wrongdoing, 
deterrence, and fairness. Justice Thomas, dissenting in part, lambasted 
the Court for condoning an arbitrary outcome resulting from a lack of 
reasonable certainty, for its failure to establish an “articulable relationship 
to Nebraska’s profits,” and for its consideration of irrelevant factors such 
as transaction costs.163 Nebraska earned its profits. How much of that 
profit is attributable to Nebraska’s skills and contributions, which 
ordinarily would offset a disgorgement award? The Court is left with the 
fact of the Special Master’s partial disgorgement award without the 
benefit of its calculus or reasoning. Unfortunately, the Court’s track 
record on thoughtful restitution, causation, and contribution analysis is 
also dim.164 
III.  RAMIFICATIONS FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE LAW 
A treacherous legal landscape results when the Court ventures into 
remedies territory, even when the Court attempts to limit the reach of its 
holdings. Future litigants will naturally deploy precedent in service of 
their own ends, and the Court has left room for future litigants to address 
the applicability of disgorgement for private breach of contract claims. 
What does the Court’s endorsement of a partial disgorgement order 
say about extending restitutionary gain-based relief for generally similar 
breaches of contract, even those involving purely private agreements? If 
one listens to the words of limitation, the Court repeatedly emphasizes 
both the public nature of the dispute and the equities inherent in the 
Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction over a dispute between sovereign 
states. Even though the dissenters used, for their own anti-disgorgement 
ends, my prior prediction about the Restatement (Third) of Restitution’s 
“novel extension” of conventional contract boundaries to include 
disgorgement grounded in unjust enrichment, I am inclined to predict 
again that the Court’s opinion in Kansas v. Nebraska will be cited to 
                                                                                                                     
 163. Id. at 1070–71 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 164. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 511, 515 (1980) (awarding a 
constructive trust over all profits for failure to seek pre-publication clearance to check for 
classified materials, even though the book in fact contained no classified information); see also 
Mark P. Gergen, Causation in Disgorgement, 92 B.U. L. REV. 827, 827–28, 833–35 (2012) 
(critiquing the Restatement (Third) of Restitution’s focus on justice and fairness, conflating the 
factual causation determination rather than providing real guidance for identifying gains legally 
attributable to the breach for disgorgement purposes, especially if the goal is derrence: why “allow 
a wrongdoer to escape legal responsibility for a loss that would normally result from his wrongful 
conduct on the ground that another fortuitous event prevented the loss from occurring”). 
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support plaintiffs’ claims for disgorgement awards in private disputes. 
The Court’s reasoning is both bold and potentially narrow. It is bold 
for endorsing a disgorgement award at all and for permitting a partial 
award that is arguably arbitrary.165 But it could have narrow precedential 
value because the Court repeatedly noted the special, public nature of the 
dispute and the import of its related original, equitable jurisdiction. 
According to Justice Thomas, the controversy “is, in essence, a contract 
dispute” warranting application of “ordinary principles of contract 
law.”166 He charges that the Court exceeded its power and misapplied 
precedent: “Invoking equitable powers, without equitable principles, the 
majority ignores the principles of contract law that we have traditionally 
applied to compact disputes between sovereign States.”167 More 
specifically, the dissenters further would reject any disgorgement order 
as “not available for a nondeliberate breach of a contract.”168 Though the 
dissenters also warned against relying on the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution, the Court forged ahead. I anticipate the ruling in Kansas v. 
Nebraska will filter into contract law jurisprudence notwithstanding the 
language of limitation. 
As a result, both the majority and the two primary dissents extensively 
discuss the Restatement (Third) of Restitution section 39, “Profit from 
Opportunistic Breach.” Scholars and other courts continue to debate the 
proper scope of application of disgorgement to contractual relief,169 
including the requisite intent for opportunism. The Court has provided, 
even as simply persuasive fodder, an interpretative gloss to the reach of 
disgorgement within at least the compact context and perhaps beyond. 
Ironically, while lamenting the Court’s endorsement of the Restatement 
(Third) of Restitution’s “proposed remedy” as “sheer novelty,” the 
dissenters build a bridge that makes the Court’s reasoning relevant to 
private breaches of contract.170 Though the disgorgement remedy 
broadens the horizons of America’s conventional contracts landscape, it 
                                                                                                                     
 165. Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1065 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 166. Id. In asserting that private contract law applies instead of federal equity jurisprudence, 
Justice Thomas emphasizes: (i) “[a]n interstate compact, though provided for in the Constitution, 
and ratified by Congress, is nonetheless essentially a contract between the signatory States” and 
(ii) “a legal settlement agreement is a contract.” Id. (quoting Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 
221, 242 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 1067 (acknowledging some Supreme Court precedent for disgorgement awards in 
compact disputes, but “only for the most culpable breaches”—deliberate ones); see id. at 1068 
(noting that disgorgement of profits is “extraordinary” because it goes beyond compensation and 
“is not generally an available remedy for breach of contract”).  
 169. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 562; Sage, supra note 25, at 258–63; Thel & 
Siegelman, supra note 12, at 1185. 
 170. See Kansas, 135 S. Ct. at 1069 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“In any event, § 39 opines that disgorgement should be available only when a party deliberately 
breaches a contract. This makes sense.”). 
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is by no means a sheer novelty. At least not anymore. Disgorgement is a 
powerful remedial alternative when warranted by the circumstances of 
the breach. With the Court’s advancement of restitution goals and 
endorsement of disgorgement with arguable application to private 
contracts, the seeds of future litigation and scholarship will grow. 
CONCLUSION 
The inclusion of disgorgement in the Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution, as an alternative remedy for opportunistic breach of contract, 
broadens the landscape of conventional American contract doctrine. Of 
course, most breaches of contract will not be opportunistic, and courts, 
with the guidance of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution, need to 
delineate carefully the proper boundaries and reach of disgorgement’s 
application. The rationale for disgorgement is in tension with some of the 
principles behind conventional contract doctrine, such as the 
compensation norm, strict liability, the choice principle, and efficient 
breach of contract. The goals of prevention of unjust enrichment and 
deterrence of conscious advantage taking, however, warrant judicial 
receptivity to disgorgement as an alternative remedy for certain breaches 
of contract. The Supreme Court’s treatment, though limited by the public 
features of the contract, inclines toward receptivity to restitution-based 
disgorgement as a breach of contract remedy. It further shows the type of 
wrongful behavior and remedial inadequacy that justify gain-based relief. 
The dissenters articulate the traditional fears about venturing into extra-
compensatory waters. The concerns are real and must be met by reasoned 
elaboration of the grounds that warrant the extension to gain-based relief 
and apportion such relief within its causal limits. With continued dialogue 
and principled reasoning, the Court’s embrace of disgorgement is a step 
in the right direction for American contract law. 
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